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THE LIMITS OF INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CORNUCOPIA OF INHERENT POWERS
JERRY L. BEAN*
Just as settlement of the United States took place by
compelling the Indians to accept European laws and prac-
tices pertaining to the land, so also domain over the tribes
themselves was achieved by substituting the rule of out-
siders for inherent self-rule.
And just as the Indians still retain bits and parcels of
their original homeland, so also they still cling to shreds of
the sovereignty which once was theirs.'
The continual conflict between the states and Indian2 tribes
over law and order jurisdiction,3 religious liberty,4 domestic rela-
tions,- hunting and fishing rights, and taxation, 7 gradually re-
defines the powers of Indian tribal governments. The concomitant
judicial8 and legislative efforts to extend the Bill of Rights to
controversies between a tribe and its members further clarifies
the powers and portends possible deterioration of the sovereign stat-
B.S. 1968, Kansas University; J.D. 1972, Kansas University Law School; member
State Bar of Kansas; the author is presently a Reginald Heber Smith Fellow in Northern
Utah.
'* The writer acknowledges and expresses gratitude for the constructive comments
and encouragement from Professors Robert Casady and Barclay Clark, Kansas University
Law School, who reviewed this manuscript.
1. H. FEy & D. McNIcxLE, INDIANS AND OTHER AMERIcANs 48 (1970).
2. For various definitions of "Indian," see F. COHEN, HAND3OOK OP FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 2-5 (University of New Mexico ed. 1942 [hereinafter cited as COHEN, HANDBOOK].
For a discussion of "Who is an Indian?" in the legal sense, see W. WASHBURN, RED
MAN'S LAND---WHrnE MAN'S LAW 163-64 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
4. See, e.g., Native American Church of North America v. NavaJo Tribal Council,
272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) ; People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950) ; Whyte v. District
Court of Montezuma County, 364 P.2d 1012, 128 cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960).
6. See, e.g., Leech Lake Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn. 1971).
7. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 83 N.M. 158, 489 P.2d 666 (1971); McClanahan
v. State Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 4,52, 484 P.2d 221 (1971); Tonasket v. State, 79
Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971( ; Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174
N.W.2d 120 (1970) ; Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 98, 451 P.2d 1002 (1969);
Comment, The Power of a State to Impose an Income Tax on Reservation Indians, 6
WrLLIAMEvTr L.J. 515 (1970) ; Comment, State Taxation of Indian Income, 1971 LAW AND
SOCIAL ORDER 355 (1971).
8. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Settler v. Yakima Tribal
Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970.)
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303 (1970).
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us of Indian tribal governments. The turning point may be reached
this year, however, when the Supreme Court decides three cases
in which state taxation of Indians and Indian enterprises is chal-
lenged.1 0
This article weighs judicial developments of the past twenty
years to measure the bounds of tribal sovereignty. The historic
federal involvement in Indian affairs"' is traced to outline the
framework of the Native American's "separateness."'1 2 From that
perspective this article will delimit the powers possessed by Indian
tribes.
1. Historical Background
The whites at first recognized and accepted the tribal and
national character of the Indian collectives with which they
dealt. It could hardly have been otherwise. The very future
of the colonies and the security of many of the states de-
pended upon a satisfactory accommodation to the power that
could be marshalled by the Indian political units. With the
decline of that power and the growth of the power of the
intruders, the individual Indian became more and more sub-
ject to white codes of law and white regulation of his acti-
vities.18
A. The Shaping of Federal Indian Policy
Governmental policies both limit and enlarge tribal powers.
The policies change from time to time, and there are elements
that go both ways in governmental policy at a given time. Federal
policy vascillates between attempted assimilaltion'4 and protection
of Indian cultural identity.15 A mammoth federal bureaucracy, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), administers services to reservation
10. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 83 N.M. 158, 489 P.2d 666 (1971) ; McClanahan
Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971) ; Tonasket v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281
(1971) ; ANNOUNCEMENTS, Nat'l. Ind. Law Lib., 1-3 (No. 8 Aug. 1972).
11. "Indian affairs In 1775 were under the Jurisdiction of the Continental Congress
When the United States Constitution was adopted, the states ceded to the federal govern-
ment the power of regulation of commerce with Indian tribes, which by statute and Judi-
cial decision was broadened to the management of Indian affairs. The agency set up for
administration of Indian affairs was established in 1824. under the War Department.
Later, In 1849, It was moved to thd Department of the Interior, where It is today."
W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THEIAMERICAN INDIAN, THE INDIAN: AMERIcAS UNFINISHED BUSINESS
119 (1969) [hereinafter cited as THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS.].
12. "As for their treatment as a separate people--Indians insist that they are just
that. The laws of the nation, including the Bill of Rights, are the white man's laws, born
of the white man's heritage. Indians do not quarrel with that but ask that their own
heritage be respected."
F. Fsy & D. McNICKLE, rupra note 1, at 7.
13. W. WASHBURN, supra note 2, at 242.
14. See H. FRITZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION, 1860-1880 (1963).
15. See THE INDIAN : AME:RICA'S UNrINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 179-93.
CORNUCOPIA OF INHERENT POWERS
Indians."6 Congress, the President, administrators, and the judiciary
formulate the policies that regulate the economic and social inter-
ests of these Indians.
In a classic judicial statement, Chief Justice Marshall presaged
the importance of respecting Indian heritage in Worcester v. Geor-
gia."* He observed that "America was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other,
and of the rest of the world, and governing themselves by their
own laws."'8 He had earlier tried to harmonize conflicting ideas
about the status of Indian tribes by depicting them as "domestic
dependent nations" related to the federal government much like
"a ward to his guardian."' 9 Marshall's wardship view in time
grew to disfavor, and those who came after him often did not
share his respect for Indian heritage.
Beginning with the mid-1800's the emphasis of the national Indian
policy was upon forced assimilation. 20 From the points of view
of the administrators and legislators, attempts at acculturation of
the reservation Indians were generally not successful. 21 The Indians,
however, physically survived the ordeal; their social and political
structures, though, were not as fortunate.
B. Legislative Patterns
By 1871 there was a growing recognition in Washington that
the tribes were no longer "independent nations. ' 22 This was the
time when Congress ended its treaty-making with the Indians.2 8
Cessation of treaty-making as well as subsequent treaty violations
mirrored Congressional attitudes about tribal sovereignty. 2
In 1887 Congress responded to public demand for Indian reform2 5
by passage of the General Allotment Act which provided for: (1)
granting citizenship to individual Indians who would take land allot-
ments, (2) divesting the tribe of title to these parcels and trans-
ferring title to the citizen, and (3) authorizing the sale of surplus
reservation land that was not allotted. 26 The effect of the Act
in the context of this discussion is that it destroyed the tribal
16. 25 C.F.R. § 1.1 et seq. (1970).
17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
18. Id. at 560-61.
19. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, S0 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
20. H. FRITz, supra note 14, at 221.
21. TaE IN IAN: AmERICA'S UNFINISnED BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 180.
22. Id.
23. See Abbott, Indians and the Law, 2 HARv. L. Rlv. 167, 171 (1888).
24. Id. THE INDIAN: AMEnIcA's UNFINISHED BusxNEss, supra note 11, at 26.
25. Note, The American Indian-Tribal Sovereignty and Civil Rights, 51 IOWA L. Rrv.
654, 663 (1966).
26. 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
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entity as the intermediary through which the individual Indian
dealt with the national government.
27
Although Congress had emasculated any powers of external
sovereignty, internal matters were still left to the tribes that had
not been dissolved as a consequence of the loss of their land
base.2 8 Internal affairs generally considered within the scope of
tribal self-government include: (1) exercise of limited civil juris-
diction; (2) lesser crimes; (3) determination of tribal membership;
(4) regulation of Indian inheritance; (5) power to tax tribal mem-
bers; (6) regulation of property within tribal jurisdiction; (7) control
over Indian domestic relations; and (8) power to determine the
form of tribal government.
2 9
By the New Deal era of the early twentieth century, people
finally realized that conformity could be legislated and thus the
national Indian policy shifted. 0 A developing attitude of respect
for differences between people and cultures led to significant legis-
lative enactments.3 1 The Dawes Act of 1924 had conferred citizenship
upon Indians.32 Ten years later, the Indian Reorganization Act
facilitated the development of tribal government units, ended the
allotment system, established more reservation land, and enabled
tribes to incorporate. s3 During the next decade, the Indian Claims
Commission Act 4 made justiciable the tribal claims against the
federal government for the taking of Indian lands.
Before the efficacy of these major legislative works could be
tested, Congress ill-advisedly withdrew federal supervision over some
tribes.2 5 Tribes were thereby "terminated." 6 Termination, a tenet
often attributed to the Eisenhower administration, 8 meant ending
the special duties of the government to Indians. The effect of
termination has been to deprive Indian tribes of both their property
and the public services for which the federal government has long
been obligated by treaties.3 8
The policy shifted again in the early 1960's and continues to
evolve today emphasizing the development of Indian tribal re-
27. THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 19-20.
28. " . . . 27,000,000 acres or two-thirds of the land allotted to individual Indians, was
also lost by sale between 1887 and 1934." W. WASHBURN, supra note 2, at 145.
29. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 122-50.
30. Note, supra note 25, at 664.
31. Id.
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (2) (1970).
33. 48 Stat. 984 (1934), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
34. 60 Stat. 1049 (1946). THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS, aupra note 11,
at 29.
35. Coulter, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the
1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COLUM. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS L. 49, 59 (1970-71).
36. Id.
37. Kerr, Conatitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the American Indian, 18 J. PUB. L.
311, 319 (1969).
38. THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFXJ0JPIED BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 180.
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sources.89 This cuts both ways. To grant massive long-term leases
to outsiders for the exploitation of reservation natural resources
produces a new source of revenue; it also depletes tribal wealth
and places management of the disposal of this wealth outside the
hands of the Indians.
On balance, the federal government exercises plenary control'
0
over external Indian concerns and the tribes are left to manage
their internal affairs. Uncertainty shrouds the extent of these tribal
powers largely because of the paternalistic domination of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. Perhaps the current self-determination movement
will gather momentum and tribes will then assert their rightful
inherent powers.
II. Derivation of Tribal Powers
. . . [T]hose powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian
tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by ex-
press acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. Each
Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal Govern-
ment as a sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and
legislation. The powers of sovereignty have been limited
from time to time by special treaties and laws designed to
take from the Indian tribes control of matters which, in the
judgment of Congress, these tribes could no longer be safely
permitted to handle.
4 1
The British may have recognized the sovereignty of the Indian
tribes as early as 1755 when superintendents responsible for good
relations with the tribes were appointed. Similar to ambassadors,
the superintendents were held accountable for international tranquil-
lity.42 Likewise, peace treaties are an early American manifesta-
tion of respect for tribal sovereignty.
48
A. First Judicial Analysis of Sovereignty-Worcester
The United States Supreme Court, in Worcester v. Georgia,"
first analyzed the basis of Indian self-government in 1832. The
State of Georgia, in its attempt to exert power over the Cherokees,
had imprisoned a white man living among the Cherokees with
the consent of tribal authorities. The Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Marshall, held that Indians were, in effect, subjects
39. Id. at 87.
40. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
41. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 122.
42. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1-10 (1961).
43. Id.
44. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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of federal law, to the exclusion of state law, and entitled to exercise
their own inherent rights of sovereignty so far as might be consistent
with such federal law.
45
Felix Cohen 46 summarizes subsequent judicial decisions regard-
ing Indian tribal powers as adhering to three fundamental principles.
These are as follows:
1. An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all of the
powers of any sovereign state.
2. Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power
of the United States and, in substance, terminates the exter-
nal powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to
enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself
affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e. its powers
of local self-government.
3. These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and
by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly
qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in
the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of
government.
4'
B. The Talton Rule
Affirming the principles noted by Cohen, the landmark case
of Talton v. Mayes'8 was the first judicial consideration of internal
tribal sovereignty. Talton presented the question of whether the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution applied to the
local legislation of the Cherokee Nation so as to require all prose-
cutions for offenses committed against the laws of that nation
to be initiated by a grand jury organized in accordance with the
Fifth Amendment. The solution to this question, according to the
Supreme Court, involved an inquiry as to the nature and origin
of the power of local government exercised by the Cherokee Nation
and recognized to exist by prior treaties and statutes.49 Although
Congress earlier had been said to have the right to regulate the
manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee Nation were
exercised, 50 the Court held that the prior decision did not render
such local powers federal powers arising from and created by
the Constitution. 1
45. Id. at 560.
46. The late Felix S. Cohen formerly served with the Department of Interior. Few
have achieved his renown as an expert In Indian law.
47. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 123.
48. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
49. Id. at 382.
50. Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
51. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, observed that:
[i]t follows that as the powers of local self-government
enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the Consti-
tution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment,
which, as we have said, had for its sole object to control
the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National
Government .
52
Another reason given why the procedural rights of the Fifth Amend-
ment were not mandatory for tribal courts was that a tribe was
not a federal instrumentality." Instead, the Court held that the
powers of an Indian tribe are not derived from the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes, but rather are inherent powers of limited
sovereignty which have never been extinguished.5 4
An Indian writer analyzes Talton as an attempt to weld two
systems, the older Cherokee and the nascent American into one
consistent pattern of jurisprudence. 5 He points out that there was
no intrusion by the federal government into the workings of the
Cherokee Republic. A reason for this is that the Cherokees, as
one of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma, 6 had a
well-respected court system. Judgments of these courts were upheld
in capital offenses.5 7
Talton prompts interesting questions. Few would argue that
Talton means that Indians are not subject to the Constitution. 5
But whether the Bill of Rights applies to the relations between
a tribe and its members remains an open question even after
the passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. 59 Just what the 1968
Civil Rights Act means is another question.6 0 Furthermore, is it
justifiable to impose these federal notions of "rights" on tribal
courts when these rights are not seen as fundamental by Indians,
and when countervailing factors unique to Indians militate against




55. V. DELORIA, JR., OF UTMOST GooD FAITH 170 (1972).
56. These five tribes are the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, Choctaw, and Seminole.
57. V. DELORIA, JR., supra note 55, at 169.
58. But see V. DELORIA, JR., supra note 55, at 170. lie sees the decision as having
contemporary relevance for every Indian tribe that operates its own tribal courts In that
"the Supreme Court found that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the relationship be-
tween the Cherokee Nation and its citizens. See also Dodge v. Nakal, 298 F. Supp.
17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
59. See Kerr, supra note 37; Coulter, supra note 35; Lazarus, Title rI of the 1968
Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. REV. 337 (1969); and Note, The
Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutfonal Status of Tribal Government, 82 Hiav. L.
REv. 1343 (1969).
60. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
61. Coulter, eupra note 35, at 51.
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How the Constitution applies to Indian tribes that were self-suf-
ficient prior to its adoption is still another open question. Cohen
said that the Constitution applies in the same sense that it does
to the City of New Orleans.6 2 The popular equation of a tribe to a
municipality is overly facile. At the very least, cities are distin-
guishable in that "state action" limitations under the Fourteenth
Amendment apply to cities and not to Indian tribes.6 8
A reversion to the nation classification14 may be appropriate
since some of the tribes operated with stable governments long
before American conquest. In 1939 tribes were regarded as "separate
political communities." 65 And in 1959 it was held that the tribes
were not states but had a "status higher than that of States.
They are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of all powers
as such only to the extent that they have been expressly required
to surrender them by a superior sovereign, the United States."66
At a minimum, 'however, and Indian tribe is a "distinct political
society ' 67 within the federal system.
C. An Extreme, But Necessary Case-Ex Parte Crow Dog
Predating Talton v. Mayes8 by 13 years, the case of Ex Parte
Crow Dog69 represents an extreme application of the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty. In Crow Dog the Supreme Court held that the
murder of one Sioux Indian by another upon an Indian reservation
was not within the criminal jurisdiction of any court of the United
States, and that only the Indian tribe could punish for the offense.
The argument for extension of federal jurisdiction was rejected,
the Supreme Court stating:
[I]t is a case where, against express exception in the
law itself, that law, by argument and inference only, is
sought to be extended to aliens and strangers; over the
members of a community separated by race, by tradition,
by the instincts of a free though savage life, from the author-
ity and power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints
of an external and unknown code, and to subject them to
the responsibilities of civil conduct, according to rules and
penalties of which they have no previous warning; which
judges them by a standard made by others and not for them,
62. F. COHEN. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 124.
63. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 21 (1968).
64. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
65. United States v. City of Salamanca, 27 F. Supp. 541, 544 (D.N.Y. 1939).
66. Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959).
67. Kane, Jurisdiction Over Indians and Indian Reservations, 6 ARIZ. L. REv. 237, 238
(1965).
68. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
69. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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which takes no account of the conditions which should except
them from its extractions, and makes no allowance for their
inability to understand it.70
The thrust of the Crow Dog opinion intimates the vast content
of criminal jurisdiction inherent in tribal sovereignty.71 It also
illustrates how far the Supreme Court was once willing to go in
opposing efforts of other courts to infringe upon tribal sovereignty.
Nevertheless, without such protection from infringement, tribal sov-
ereignty is an illusion indeed.
D. Decision Respects Differing Heritage-Ex Parte Tiger
Tribal sovereignty was buttressed in the case of Ex Parte
Tiger.72 It signaled the judicial recognition that Indian courts need
not be guided by the Anglo-Saxon common law, but may properly
consider traditions and circumstances of Indian people. The Court
acknowledged that "[t]hey derive their jurisprudence from an
entirely different source, and they are as unfamiliar with common
law terms and definitions as they are with Sanskrit or Hebrew."' "7
In brief, tribal government is derived from the original sover-
eign power to govern their affairs and is qualified by the subsequent
judicial, legislative, and administrative restrictions. Hence, the tribes
retain a sovereign authority. The contemporary meaning of tribal
sovereignty is defined in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine
Ridge Reservation,74 as follows:
• . . It would seem clear that the Constitution, as construed
by the Supreme Court acknowledges the paramount authority
of the United States with regard to Indian tribes but recog-
nizes the existence of Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign enti-
ties possessing all the inherent rights of sovereignty except
where restrictions have been placed thereon by the United
States, itself.
7 5
The dimensions of this quasi-sovereignty can best be examined
in the context of specific cases, e.g., in the areas of law and
order jurisdiction, religious liberty, domestic relations, and hunting
and fishing rights. An attempt is next made to consider the major
cases of the past twenty years to illuminate the present limits
of tribal sovereignty.
70. Id. at 571.
71. See Kane, supra note 67, at 239-44.
72. Ez Parte Tiger, 2 Ind. T. 41, 47 S.W. 304 (1898).
78. Id. at 305.
74. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
75. Id. at 92.
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III. Indians and Courts in a Jurisdictional Maze
Much has been written about the unique problems of Indian
courts, 76 but what should be changed, if anything, remains an
open question principally because of historic and cultural differences
between tribal justice and that of the dominant Anglo society. Con-
gress responded in 1968, however, with what has been heralded
as an "Indian Bill of Rights ' 7 7 for Indian courts. Initial Indian
opposition to the Act was strong.78 The legislation appears to have
been a misguided attempt to help. A frankensteinian nature emerges
when Indian judicial procedures have welded onto them the Anglo-
American constitutional guarantees.
A. Tripartite Jurisdiction
Indians may be subjected simultaneously to three legal codes-
federal, state, and tribal.7 9 All three can conceivably be involved
in various phases of the same case.80 Consequently, great confusion
as to which government should exercise jurisdiction exists.81 Doubt-
less a complete jurisdictional vacuum sometimes results, thereby
denying due process and equal protection of the laws.
2
B. Bounds of Tribal Jurisdiction
Indian courts vary like flowers in a field of diverse cultures
known as tribes. One Senate inventory lists 12 courts of Indian
offenses (established by the BIA); 53 "tribal" courts (organized
by tribal members under BIA guidelines); and 19 traditional courts
(in a form that existed prior to the founding of America.)8 Little
has been recorded about the operation of Indian courts. 84 This
is not too surprising since some Indian courts bar non-Indian lawyers
from appearing before them.8 5
76. See, e.g., Ka u, supra note 67; Kerr, supra note 37, at 318-19.
77. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
78. Hearings on Rights of Members of Indian Tribes Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 37
(1968). Indicative of the objections is the statement of the Pueblos:
Section [1303], habeas corpus, opens an avenue through which Federal
Courts, lacking knowledge of our traditional values, customs and laws, could
review and offset the decisions of our councils sitting as courts and acting
on the basis of our own laws and customs as tribal courts
But see 113 CoNo. REc. § 18157 et seq. (Dec. 7, 1967) for endorsements of the legislation.
79. THE INDIAN: AManIcA's UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 45.
80. Id.
81. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERIcAN
INDIAN S. REP. No. 265 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1964) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
or THE AMERICAN INDIAN].
82. Id.
83. Id. at 15.
84. See generally Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HAv. L. RT. 1818,
1832-38 (1968) ; Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Seas. (1961).
85. Id. at 1836.
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The criminal jurisdiction of Indian courts is extensive; it en-
compasses all tribally defined offenses except those crimes pre-
empted by the so-called Major Crimes Act.8 6 Their power is bolstered
because few decisions are appealed"7 and appeal may be imprac-
tical.88
Similarly, Indian courts are not courts of record. As the judges
do not write opinions there is no developed body of precedents.
Penalties, when imposed, usually do not exceed six months in
jail.8 9 The emphasis is upon restitution and rehabilitation.9 ° For
instance, a tradition among the Omaha tribe is for the offender
to have to put on a dinner dance to benefit the injured party.9
Lastly, since the tribal council often appoints the tribal judges,
these judges serve at the will of the tribal council and cannot
be expected to render detached judgments.
2
Indian courts apparently wage a close race with city and county
courts that serve the communities adjacent to the reservations
in terms of their caseloads.9 All three courts generally handle
the lesser behavioral crimes. The 13 "major" crimes9" were taken
away from the jurisdiction of the Indian courts and placed under
the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. In practice, though,
state courts often assume this jurisdiction over major crimes by
default 95 at a time when most state courts have little actual juris-
diction over offenses committed on Indian reservations. Indian
courts also may be hearing major crimes because United States
Attorneys often refuse to prosecute Indian cases.9 7 Delineation of
the interrelationships of the judicial authority and operation of the
three governmental units elucidates some of the unanswered ques-
tions regarding the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Indian courts.
C. The Any Man's Land of Checkerboard Jurisdiction
The curtain continues to rise and fall on an old drama in
86. 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885). See Comment, Indictment Under the "Major Crimes
Act"--An Exercise in Unfairness and Unconstitutionality, 10 ARiz. L. REV. 691 (1968).
87. Kerr, supra note 37, at 322.
88. For example, the Ute Mountain Tribal Law and Order Code provides for appeal to
the federal district court In Denver which is hundreds of miles from Towaoc.
89. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, aupra note 81.
90. Kerr, supra note 37, at 320.
91. Interview with Elmer Blackbird, Mar. 10, 1972, in Lawrence, Kansas.
92. Kerr, supra note 37, at 322.
93. W. RAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES (1966).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
95. Letter from Robert B. Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colo., to James D.
Childress, Assistant Attorney, Sixth Judicial District, Durango, Colo., April 26, 1966,
stating In part:
As far as the prospect of our assuming jurisdiction for prosecution
purposes, we must decline in this Instance. I am sure that you appreciate
what an epic a Federal prosecution can be and the volume in our office
necessitates that we screen all cases carefully.
96. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 116-17.
97. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 81, at 7.
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Indian Country- in spite of the Supreme Court's implicit ban of
repeat performances. The scene is any state in which an Indian
reservation is located. A portion of the original area of the reser-
vation has been diminished by sale or other disposition. Action
begins with the commission of a so-called major crime9 9 by an
Indian at a locus which formerly was within Indian Country and
has never been disestablished. The tension increases as the alleged
offender is incarcerated in a tribal or county jail. A climax is
reached when there is an awareness that even though this is
an offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
the United States attorney's office will refuse to exercise jurisdic-
tion. 100 The tribal or state court then exercises jurisdiction by de-
fault. 01 While the statutes do not provide for such action, crowded
dockets have rewritten the script.
The law is well settled that a major crime committed on a par-
ticular parcel of land within the original boundaries of an Indian
reservation which has never been disestablished is an offense within
the exclusive federal jurisdiction. 0 2 In Seymour v. Superintendent
of Washington State Penitentiary,0 3 the Supreme Court unanimously
held that a state court had no jurisdiction over a burglary committed
within the limits of the south half of the Colville reservation, even
though the parcel of land was held under a patent in fee by
a non-Indian, and was located within a town. Seymour, a member
of the Colville tribe, entered a guilty plea to attempted burglary
in a Superior Court. After conviction he filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Washington, urging
that the state court had lacked jurisdiction since the crime was
committed in Indian Country. The petition was denied on the ground
that the land on which the burglary was committed was no longer
an Indian reservation.
10 4
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, reversed,
holding that the land had not lost its status as an Indian reservation,
and that it was immaterial that the piece of land was located in a
town.10 5 The Court relied, in part, upon an earlier decision stating:
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970) defines Indian Country as including "all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent..."
99. Thesa include: murder; manslaughter; rape; carnal knowledge of any female, not
his wife, who has not attained the age of 16 years; assault with intent to commit rape;
Incest; assault with intent to kill; assault with a dangerous weapon; assault resulting in
serious bodily injury; arson; burglary; robbery, and larceny.
100. See note 95 supra.
101. See CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 81, at 7-8.
102. Kane, supra note 67, at 239 n. 19.
103. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
104. Seymour v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 109, 346 P.2d 669 (1959).
105. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962).
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"when Congress has once established a reservation all tracts in-
cluded within it remain a part of the reservation until separated
therefrom by Congress."'
10
Subsequent decisions reinforce the Seymour holding. 07 Never-
theless, as a practical matter the decision does not guarantee a
United States attorneys' offices. 10 8 It does, however, give defense
federal court trial because of the volume of cases handled by the
attorneys a plea-bargaining lever. 0 9
D. Indian Courts and the Bill of Rights
The leading case of Talton v. -Mayes"° stands for the proposition
that a tribal government, absent any federal action, is not required
to grant Indians a procedural right-a right concerning the form
and manner in which the power of government is exercised-confer-
red by the United States Constitution."' Whether a tribe may deny
its members a substantive right, such as the freedom of religion,
is an open question."
2
The lower federal district courts have uniformly withheld basic
protections of the Bill of Rights in situations involving a tribe
and its membership;113 neither the due process clause nor the equal
protection clause prevented a tribe from imposing a tax only on
non-members for use of trust lands;"1 4 the First Amendment was
no barrier to tribal punishment for the ritual use of peyote; "1
the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to a tribal taking of prop-
erty; 116 and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was held inap-
plicable."17
Although the lower courts seem to be following Talton, a deci-
sion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals flies in the face of
the long standing rule."11 Colliflower v. Garland enunciated a newly-
106. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
107. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
108. Set note 95 supra.
109. For example, a deputy Colorado Public Defender used this jurisdictional question
to secure a reduction of a felonious battery charge to a simple misdemeanor battery on
egregious facts. This result was achieved despite a substantial question as to whether
that portion of the Southern Ute reservation had been disestablished. Interview with
Grace Merlo in Cortez, Colorado, June 30, 1971.
110. Talton v. Mays, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
111. The right to a grand jury Constituted pursuant to the constitution was at issue.
See Lazarus, supra note 59, at 341.
112. But see Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272
F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
113. Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 960 (1958).
114. Baxta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
932 (1959).
115. Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131
(10th Cir. 1959).
116. United States v. Seneca Nation of New York Indians, 274 F. 946 (W.D.N.Y. 1921).
117. Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963).
118. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
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divined premise that tribal courts "function in part as a federal
agency," and thereby licensed the district court to inquire into
the legality of detention of an Indian pursuant to an order of
the Indian court.119 The impact of threats to the Talton rule12
including the 1968 Civil Rights Act 12 1 have not been measured. The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Collif lower v. Garland 122 seems wrong;
it is judicial meddling into internal tribal affairs. At most, the
decision should only apply to courts established by the BIA as was
that court. A well-written opinion, notwithstanding, the court failed
to adequately distinguish prior well-reasoned cases 12 reaching a
contrary conclusion on similar facts, and therefore should not be
followed. Does one dose of federal interference by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs call for another by the judiciary?
Colliflower has been criticized by one commentator as an ex-
ample of hard facts making bad law.124 The court expressly narrowed
its decision to the facts before it but its holding might be applied
more broadly by another court in a later case.
E. Extension of the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine, The Right
to Refuse to Extradite
Although the holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Colliflower1 25 dealt a blow to tribal sovereignty, the court recanted
and bolstered the doctrine in 1969. In fact, it broadened sovereignty
regarding extradition beyond that enjoyed by 49 states. 2 In Arizona
ex. rel. Merrill v. Turtle," 7 Turtle had been arrested by a county
sheriff and detained in tribal jail pursuant to the request of Okla-
homa authorities who sought him for alleged second degree forgery
in Oklahoma. He was a Cheyenne residing on the Navajo Reserva-
tion and was protected by the Navajo Tribal Council who refused
the extradition request on the ground that the Navajo Tribal Code
allowed extradition only to Arizona, Utah, or New Mexico. 2 8 Okla-
homa next contacted Arizona's governor who agreed to the extra-
dition. The jurisdictional question was raised in a habeas corpus
proceeding. The Ninth Circuit held that Arizona's attempted extra-
dition "would clearly interfere with rights essential to the Navajos'
119. Id. at 379.
120. Lazarus, supra note 59.
121. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
122. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1969).
123. See, e.g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 94-98 (1956); Oliver v.
Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963).
124. Lazarus, supra note 59, at 344. But see 79 HAv. L. Rxv. 4,36, 437 (1965).
125. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
126. See 79 HIARv. L. REV. 436 (1965).
127. Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970).
128. NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE tit. 17, § 1841 (1962).
CORNUCOPIA OF INHERENT POWERS
self-government,' ' 129 and affirmed a federal district court's deter-
mination that the state had neither jurisdiction to arrest the appellee
nor the power to extradite him.1
3
1
The decision is remarkable in light of facts on which the Ninth
Circuit might have gone the other way. The presence of a Cheyenne
on a Navajo reservation, for instance, suggests the possibility of
a political-asylum. The decision may herald a re-elevating of tribes
to positions of sovereignty like those of independent nations. None-
theless, the holding should not be regarded as a misconception
of sovereignty nor a misapplication of the tribal self-government
concept. 1' 3 Extradition is an aspect of the self-government possessed
by states.13 2 Tribes have been analogized to states, and, in some
ways are regarded as more sovereign than states. 3  Thus tribal
self-government should include the right to determine whether extra-
dition shall be allowed.
1 84
F. Guidelines for Courts in Construing the Indian Civil Rights
Act
Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act" 5 popularly referred to
as an "Indian Bill of Rights" has been judicially construed about
129. Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1969).
130. Id.
131. Contra, Comment, The "Right of Tribal Self-Government" and Jurisdiction of In-
dian Affairs, 1970, UTAH L. REv. 291, 295 (1970).
132. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
133. Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131
(10th Cir. 1959).
134. This was one of two conclusions grounding the Ninth Circuit's decision. The other
was that a state may not infringe upon rights essential to the Navajo's self-government.
135. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 [codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1302-1303 (Supp. 1971)], the text of which is as follows:
§ 1302. Constitutional Rights
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue war-
rants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compentation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assist-
ance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive ball, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months
or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law;
(9) pass any bill or attainder or ex post facto law; or
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thirty times in the past four years. Departmental rulings from
the Solicitor's office concerning application of the statute number
at least eight. It is likely that the Indian Bill of Rights offers
a limitless potential for litigation.
Judicial consideration of any issue arising under the 1968 statute
must be analyzed in the context of the extent to which the federal
government ought to intervene and impose restrictions upon the
tribal governments. Hence in each case the court must balance
the erosion of Indian tribal autonomy that will be caused against
the benefits that will be acquired by the individual from the new
rights. Since the statute is aimed at limitations on the tribal govern-
ment, each lawsuit is a potential threat to tribal sovereignty. This
threat branches out in two directions. One aspect is the imposition
of Anglo-Saxon judicial standards and requirements upon the tribes,
which they may or may not be financially or otherwise able to
meet and which may be inappropriate in light of tribal customs
and traditions. Another aspect is that the statute allows non-Indian
intervention in Indian affairs.
Illustrative of the threat to tribal sovereignty posed by the im-
position of Anglo-Saxon judicial standards is the possible conflict in
literal application of the "equal protection" and "due process of
law" language. 13 Assuming a hypothetical fact situation in which
a tribal law and order code prescribed a fine and no imprison-
ment for a certain offense which had been violated by an impecu-
nious Indian defendant. To read "equal protection" as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court in Tate v. Short'37 requires
that the impecunious defendant not be jailed if he is unable to pay
his fine when a person who could pay the fine is not jailed.
Tate might be read in tandem with Argersinger v. Hamlin'38 . Since
criminal cases heard in Indian courts are misdemeanors, the ap-
plication of Argersinger would require appointment of counsel for
indigents when there was a possibility of a jail sentence. If a tribe
tries to get around Argersinger by amending its law and order code
to only prescribe fines, the Tate question still is present. The con-
flict is put in focus by a provision of the Indian Bill of Rights that
guarantees the right of counsel at the individual's expense. 39 After
Argersinger this provision may have no vitality. Tribes may be
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment 6'>
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
§ 1303. Habeas corpus
The privilege of the write of habeas corpus shall be available to any per-
son, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order on an Indian tribe.
136. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (Supp. 1971).
137. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). See Memo. Asso. Sol. (July 21, 1971).
138. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
139. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (6) (Supp. 1971).
318
CORNUCOPIA OF INHERENT POWERS
forced to provide counsel or experienced lay advocates. Moreover,
if tribes are forced to provide attorneys to defend indigent tribal
members the operation of the Indian courts could be upset since
most tribal judges are laymen. Additionally, if the tribal budget is
low, the expense of attorneys presents another problem. Court op-
eration might be hampered if there is a defense attorney, since
most Indian courts lack prosecutors; a tribe may be obliged to hire
another attorney to prosecute.
An answer may lie in applying the spirit of equal protection and
not the strict doctrine as it is reflected in federal caselaw. The
spirit of equal protection could be tempered with tribal customs, tra-
ditions, and to some extent the fiscal resources of the tribe. Ju-
dicial deference to a culture different than that of the dominant
society is not without precedent. The Supreme Court in dictum has
noted that:
the relations of the federal courts to Puerto Rico have
often raised delicate problems. It is a Spanish-speaking
Commonwealth with a set of laws still impregnated with
Spanish tradition. Federal courts, reversing Puerto Rican
courts, were inclined to construe Puerto Rican laws in the
Anglo-Saxon tradition which often left little room for the
overtones of Spanish culture. Out of that experience grew
a pronouncement by this Court that a Puerto Rican court
should not be overruled on its construction of local law un-
less it could be said to be "inescapably wrong." 40
A comparable deference to Indian courts' construction of tribal
law should be extended. Similarly, the principle should be extended
to cases based upon the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act; courts should
follow local tradition and customs unless these could be said to be
"inescapably wrong."
The other aspect of the threat to tribal sovereignty is the avail-
ability of direct access to federal courts for non-Indians who are
at odds with the tribe. Two cases brought by legal services attor-
neys reflect the ease of non-Indian intervention and the manner in
which some courts might be expected to greet such lawsuits. In
Dodge v. Nakail4 a non-Indian lawyer filed an action after he had
been excluded from the Navajo reservation for allegedly disruptive
behavior in the Navajo council chambers. The federal court found
that the Navajo Advisory Committee's actions violated the free
speech, due process, and bill of attainder clauses of the statute. "
140. Fornaus v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
141. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
142. Id. at 31, 32, 33.
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The Zuni legal services office brought Wasson v. Gray.1"3 The fed-
eral court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting interference
by defendants with plaintiff's right of access to the on-reservation
tribal administration building.
The threat is compounded by the fact that although the 1968
Indian Civil Rights Act provides for the remedy of habeas corpus
alone, injunctive relief, and monetary damages also have been
awarded based on supplemental statutory bases.1 4 4 The availability
of additional remedies increases the vulnerability of tribes before
the non-Indian tribunals. Extreme caution must be exercised lest
the statute becomes the shibboleth of the non-Indian in conflict
with tribal interests. If an interest-balancing test had been applied
in the cases brought by the legal service attorneys, the cases might
have gone the other way. Courts must consider legitimate tribal in-
terests. Greater weight must be given the interests of tribes in
maintaining cultural autonomy and political sovereignty.
IV. Recent Decisions Bolster Eroded Foundation
Recent decisions strongly point to the re-establishment of tribal
sovereignty in the areas of religion, contract, divorce, hunting and
fishing rights, and immunity from taxation.
A. Restriction on Religion, an End-Run Around the First
Amendment
In the leading case, Native American Church of North America
v. Navajo Tribal Council,14 5 the federal court refused to review the
Navajo anti-Peyote ordinance on the ground that the first amend-
ment did not apply to tribal restrictions on religious practice. A
class action had been brought by the Native American Church of
North America seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a tribal or-
dinance making it an offense to introduce into Navajo country, sell,
use, or have in possession within Navajo country, the bean known
as peyote. It was alleged that the ordinance was void because it
violated the church's rights and the rights of its members under
the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the action.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that:
... No provision in the Constitution makes the First Amend-
ment applicable to Indian nations nor is there any law of
Congress doing so. It follows that neither, under the Consti-
143. Wasson v. Gray, Civil No. 9223, (D.N.M. 1971).
144. See, e.g., Longsassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971); Spotted Eagle
v. Blackfoot Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
145. Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
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tution or the laws of Congress, do the Federal courts have
jurisdiction of tribal laws or regulations, even though they
may have an impact to some extent on forms of religious
worship.1 8
One writer criticizes the Tenth Circuit's decision as a blind ad-
herence to an old rule. 14 7 Granted that the opinion gave scant at-
tention to the civil libertarian ramifications of such a holding, the
court reached the only practical result. To have held otherwise
would have impaired the sovereignty of the Navajo Tribal Council,
particularly since the church subsequently prevailed by political
means in getting the council to change the ordinance. 48
Earlier in Toledo v. Pueblo De Jemez 49 the New Mexico federal
district court had held that a deprivation of religious liberties by a
tribal government that did not derive its powers from a state or
from the United States could not be redressed by action under a
federal civil rights act. 150 Six Jemez Pueblo Indians, all of whom
were members of various protestant denominations, filed a com-
plaint for declaratory judgment against the Pueblo of Jemez. They
charged that the Pueblo refused them the right to bury their dead
in the community cemetery; denied them the right to build a church
of their own on Pueblo land; prohibited them from using their homes
for church purposes; refused to permit Protestant missionaries free-
ly to enter the Pueblo at reasonable times, and deprived some of
them of the right to use a communal threshing machine which
threatened the loss of their wheat crop.151 The court properly found
that there was no basis for holding that the conduct of the de-
fendants of which the plaintiffs complained was done under color
of state law; otherwise, the quasi-sovereignty of the theocratic
community would have been debilitated.
Religious freedom raises comnlex ouestions. When a tribe takes
action that would be unconstitutional for the federal or state gov-
ernment, the aggrieved party is without a forum in which he can
anpeal for redress. The dilemma intensifies because an extension
of a federal or state anpeal would enfeeble tribal sovereignty. An
answer is to establish Indian Courts of Appeal independent from the
federal courts and the BIA.1 52 The courts could be located geograph-
ically across the country in areas of Indian population concentration.
146. Id. at 135.
147. Note, suvra note 25, at 666.
148. Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARv. L. Rzv. 1818, 18,28 (1968).
Based on his Interviews the writer states that "[olnly after several years of inconsistent
enforcement In the tribal courts and active church support for candidates pledged to
legalize peyote did the council comply with the church's demand."
149. Toledo v. Pueblo De Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429, 432 (D.N.M. 1954).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
151. Toledo v. Pueblo De Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D.N.M. 1954).
152. Kerr, supra note 37, at 329.
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Thus in cases where the individual was oppressed by a tribal judge
or official, one could appeal without the harm of further federal
interposition.
Kerr has suggested that a series of circuit courts of appeal be
established and that these be composed of Indian tribal judges and
laymen acquainted with Indian traditions."55 He aptly notes that such
an appeal system ignores what he terms a salient characteristic of
most tribal law-that it is unwritten and not found in Indian con-
stitutions. Nevertheless, since some Navajo tribal court decisions
have been reported since 1969, this objection may be overcome.
154
It remains to be seen whether other tribal courts will report their
decisions.
A more vital point concerning Indian appellate courts is what
law they would apply. Would it be higher than tribal law? If not,
what function could they serve except to police procedures? The
diverse backgrounds and characteristics of the numerous tribes
argues for application of local tribal law. Where a tribe's law is
unknown a problem would exist. Additionally, intertribal disputes
could raise serious choice of law questions. This might necessitate
a body of law superior to tribal law. The source of this superior
law might be inter-tribal pacts or treaties.
B. Supreme Court Affirms Tribal Jurisdiction over Contracts-
Williams v. Lee
The United States Supreme Court replenished tribal authority
in Williams v. Lee' 55 holding that the exercise of state jurisdiction
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to
govern themselves, which was recognized by Congress in the Treaty
of 1868 with the Navajos and has never been taken away. 56 The
action was brought by a non-Indian who operated a general store
in Arizona on the Navajo Indian Reservation. In the Superior Court
of Arizona he sought to collect for goods sold on credit to a
Navajo Indian and his wife. In spite of the defendant's motion to
153. See, e.g., In re Chischilly, Sr., Civil No. 8813 (Feb. 29, 1972): Navajo Tribe v.
Bahe, Civil No. 9154,2 (Jan. 11, 1972); and Navajo Tribe v. Littleman, Civil No. 41950
(Dec. 7, 1971).
154. Note, 46 WAsH. L. RIv. 541, 552 (1971). The danger of BIA affiliation is ex-
pressed in the following statement made before a Congressional subcommittee by Roy
Waite, Morongo Band of Mission Indians:
You mentioned a while ago about the sovereign power of the tribe,
but we do not have sovereign power and, in fact, we have no power at all
because everything we do goes through and must be approved by the Bureau.
Hearings on constftutionaZ rights of the American Indian before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, pt. II, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 328.
155. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
156. Id. at 223.
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dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction lay in the tribal court
rather than in the state court, judgment was entered in favor of
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed.
15 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because it
felt that there 'had been a doubtful determination of the important
question of state power over Indian affairs. 158 The court took note
that the tribe had "in recent years greatly improved its legal
system through increased expenditures and better-trained person-
nel. Today the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses exercise broad
criminal and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders
against Indian defendants.' 5 9 It was immaterial that the plaintiff
was not an Indian.8 0
The decision did not reach some crucial questions that might be
raised. Was the reason the Indian court had exclusive jurisdiction
the fact that no federal act has given state courts jurisdiction over
such controversies? Under traditional conflict of laws analysis one
might expect the court to have zeroed in on the point that the con-
tract was entered into upon the reservation. Could the Indian court
have jurisdiction over an off-reservation contract? Finally, does at
least one party have to be an Indian or a member of that tribe?
Williams is a particularly significant decision because of the
dearth of Supreme Court opinions regarding the status of Indian
tribes since Worcester v. Georgia.16' In short, it is the last word
on the question of tribal sovereignty. Hopefully, Williams will serve
as a beacon to both federal and state courts steering through the
jurisdictional waters surrounding Indian cases, both civil and crim-
inal.16
2
C. Recognition of Tribal Regulation of Domestic Relations, a
Nameless Rule Akin to Comity
Indian tribal custom marriage and divorce have traditionally
been recognized by both federal and state governments. 63 An early
judicial recognition of tribal jurisdiction in the field of domestic re-
lations was registered in the form of dictum in the case of United
States v. Quiver.6 4 A Sioux allegedly committed adultery with
another Sioux on a reservation in South Dakota. Prosecution for
adultery was held to be outside the jurisdiction of the federal dis-
157. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
158. Williams v. Lee, 356 U.S. 930 (1958).
159. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
160. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
161. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
182. See Wbyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 346 P.2d 1012, 1014-15, cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960).
163. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 137-39.
164 United States v. Quirer, 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
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trict court because no statute which in terms referred to Indians
had conferred jurisdiction on the court. The court observed:
At an early period it became the settled policy of
Congress to permit the personal and domestic relations of
the Indians with each other to be regulated, and offenses
by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian to be dealt with according to their tribal customs
and laws.165
In Begay v. Miller, 6  a case of first impression, the Arizona
Supreme Court considered the jurisdiction of an Indian court in the
field of domestic relations. The question arose in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to secure release from incarceration in the
county jail by a husband who had been committed after having
been found guilty of contempt of Superior Court for failure to pay
alimony. The state court held that where husband and wife were
properly before the Navajo Indian Court and the Indian Court enter-
ed a decree of divorce, the Superior Court of Apache County was
without jurisdiction to enter a subsequent decree of divorce, and
therefore an order holding husband in contempt of the Superior
Court was a nullity.
187
Since Begay antedates Williams by nearly two decades, the un-
derpinnings of Begay may have been eroded, particularly since
there is an unarticulated assumption in Begay of concurrent state
and tribal jurisdiction over domestic relations. This is hard to rec-
oncile with the contract situation in Williams where it was held
that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction. If concurrent juris-
diction does exist in domestic relations, a state judgment prior in
time would be valid. Would the tribal court be bound to recognize
and enforce the state judgment? Williams must be read as mean-
ing that Arizona state courts lack jurisdiction over all civil and
criminal matters. Begay is still instructive, however, in the reason-
ing followed by the court in concluding that it must recognize the
validity of Indian court decrees.
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected an argument asserting that
the Court of Indian Offenses was a federal court under Art. 3,
Sec. 1, of the federal Constitution. Its answer was that the Indian
court was "simply a tribal court exercising jurisdiction retained by
the Indians over their own domestic problems."' 6 The court rea-
soned that since the federal government concedes the validity of
165. Id. at 603-04.
166. Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950).
167. Id. at 629-30.
168. Id. at 628.
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such divorces, it could see no constitutional basis for the courts of
Arizona to refuse to recognize the validity of such decrees. The
court was unable to find a rubric for the recognition; it stated:
. . . Such recognition obviously is not made under the "full
Faith and Credit" clause of Art. 4, Sec. 1, of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, for clearly this clause applies
only between states of the Union. Neither is it done under
the commonly accepted meaning of the term "comity,"
which presupposes two independent sovereign nations, be-
cause the Navajo tribe is not now classed as such, but we
recognize it because of the general rule, call it by what-
ever name you will, that a divorce valid by the law where
it is granted is recognized as valid everywhere. The fact
that a formal decree is now entered by a tribal court does
not vary in any way the recognition theretofore accorded
in this anomalous situation. 169
The terse analysis of "full faith and credit" and "comity" may
indicate a hesitancy to blaze a new trail. Implicit in the analysis
seems to be that regardless of the status of the Navajo tribe a
unique form of comity calls for recognition of its divorce judgments.
Recognition of the divorce decrees of Indian courts is a significant
step in re-establishing tribal sovereignty. The decision, while not
overly lucid, should not be confined to its facts. Valid judgments
of Indian courts in all areas deserve similar support, notwithstand-
ing the absence of case support.
The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion when
it considered whether a state district court had jurisdiction to pro-
ceed to judgment in a divorce action. In Whyte v. District Court
of Montezuma County,17 0 the court agreed with the plaintiff's argu-
ment that:
• . . Surely, if a non-Indian's rights under a contract made
with an Indian on an Indian reservation are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court, it must follow that
a contract of marriage entered into on an Indian reserva-
tion between two enrolled members of the tribe must be
governed by tribal law. 17'1
The court thought Williams v. Lee 172 controlled the case and
gave no other basis for its decision. 1'7 3 Nevertheless, by 'holding that
the state court was without jurisdiction the court added to the
169. Id.
170. Whyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 346 P.2d 1012, cert. denied, 363
U.S. 829 (1960).
171. Id. at 1014.
172. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
173. Whyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 346 P.2d 1012, 1014-15 (1959).
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mounting weight of authority against interference with tribal affairs.
The decision also affirmed that "[a]s a corollary to federal sov-
ereignty it is clear that state laws have no force within the ter-
ritory of an Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians.'
17 4
In summary, the diversity of Indian cultures is a cogent reason
for tribal sovereignty in domestic relations. Judicial clarification is
needed to refine the source of the general rule calling for enforce-
ment of valid tribal marriages and divorces. Is it comity? At
present it may be possible to forum shop. Tribal law sometimes
recognizes the validity of marriage by custom, 17 5 whereas the state
courts in Utah would likely invalidate them. 176 One writer argues
that "since we recognize the validity of tribal laws, it would seem
both logical and practical that we recognize the validity of Indian
Court judgments and decrees based thereon, at least insofar as In-
dian personal and domestic relations are concerned."'
177 Comity is
arguably due Indian court judgments to protect cultural diversity
and manifest respect for persons of different backgrounds, partic-
ularly when some of these courts pre-date the American Constitution.
D. Fishing Rights, Tribes, Treaties, and States-A Continual
Hassle
Rights of hunting, fishing, and trapping are guaranteed to In-
dian tribes by treaties 78 and statutes.179 Controversies involving
these rights are generally clashes between states and tribes. It is
clear, though, that when treaties with Indian tribes have secured
to them certain rights such as hunting and fishing, the state laws
cannot override a tribe's treaty rights. 80 Concomitantly, tribal
rights to hunt and fish are subject to federal regulations. 81
Methods and direction of regulation of Indian fishing rights vary
even within a state. For instance, the Secretary of Interior deter-
mines the regulation of fishing on Alaskan reservations. 1 2 Regula-
tion by the State of Alaska of Indian off-reservation fishing rights,
even where such rights are preserved by federal treaty, has been
approved by the Supreme Court when it did not impinge on treaty-
protected reservation self-government.1 83
174. Id. at 1014.
175. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.28 (1971).
176. In re Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 (1946).
177. Kane, Jurisdiction Over Indians and Indian Reservations, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 237, 255
(1965).
178. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 285.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 286. But see Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Tulee v. Washing-
ton, 315 U.S 681 (1942).
181. COHEN, H-ANDB3OOK, supra note 2, at 286.
182. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 59 (1962).
183. Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
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A recent case, Leech Lake Indians v. Herbst,184 may foretell in-
creased sovereignty with regard to aboriginal hunting and fishing
rights. Declaratory judgment actions were brought by the Leech
Lake band of Chippewa Indians and the United States against the
Minnesota Commissioner of Natural Resources and the State of
Minnesota to determine whether Indians might fish, hunt, and har-
vest wild rice on the public lands and waters of the Leech Lake
Reservation without complying with Minnesota fish and game laws.
The district court declared:
. . . [T]hat Plaintiff Indians have the right to hunt and fish
and gather wild rice on public lands and public waters of the
Leech Lake reservation free of Minnesota game and fish
laws. Defendants are enjoined from enforcing such laws.8 5
The Leech Lake Band also sought the exclusive right to regu-
late hunting and fishing of Indian and non-Indian alike on the res-
ervation the same as the Minnesota Red Lake Indians do.18 6 The
court refused to grant this right distinguishing the instant case as
an "open" reservation of the Leech Lake Indians as contrasted to
the "closed" reservation off the Red Lake Indians.187 Granted that
different tribes have enjoyed different relationships with the govern-
ment and have been subject to different expressions of Congression-
al policy, this looms as too important a question for such treat-
ment. Instead, courts must look beyond labels such as "open" or
"closed" reservations and devote more attention to Indian wishes
of protecting their land and culture.
This decision has spawned controversy among the whites and
Indians of Cass Lake, Minnesota. 188 The local whites fear that the
decision is just the first step in a process which could ultimately
establish the Indians right to license resorts and to be in charge
of licensing hunting and fishing for non-Indians. 18 9 They also fear
that the Chippewas will commence large scale commercial fishing
and that this would ruin sport fishing. 90
The implications of Leech Lake Indians for tribal sovereignty
are uncertain. The decision has been appealed. On the one hand,
the Chippewas ask that their treaty rights be protected. And on the
other, local whites urge that the Indians gave up these rights when
they became citizens; they see the decision as forcing segregation
184. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn.
1971).
185. Id. at 1006.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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and two sets of rules. Clearly, Indian tribes and bands such as the
Chippewas are entitled to those rights not extinguished by subse-
quent treaties nor abrogated by the United States. Those Indians
who have left the reservations, or whose reservations were abolish-
ed may be in a different posture. It is certainly arguable that they
should retain their tribal rights, especially when they may have had
no alternative other than leaving. Furthermore, by enforcing their
treaty rights, Indians may be able to reclaim a measure of sov--
ereignty.
E. Taxation - The Power to Tax is the Power to Destroy
In 1819 when then Chief Justice Marshall declared in McCulloch
v. Maryland'91 that "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy," he referred to state taxation of the national bank. Today
the Mescalero Apache Tribe has made a similar argument against
state taxation; this time it is state taxation of an Indian ski-resort
business on non-reservation land.19 2 Attempts by states to tax tribal
lands and operations is not new. The landmark case is The Kansas
Indians.193 The Supreme Court held that tribal lands and lands
owned by individual tribal members were not subject to state tax
laws. Cohen states that the original reason for tribal immunity
from state taxation was the fact that the tribes were regarded as
distinct political communities exercising some of the attributes of
a sovereign body.1 94 Courts have relied upon sovereignty as well as
what has been called the "instrumentality" theory in immunizing
tribal lands from state taxation. Illustrative of the instrumentality
theory is the decision of the United States Court of Appeals in
United States v. Thurston County. 95 The court held that proceeds
from the sales of allotted trust lands were exempt from state tax-
ation because the proceeds like the lands from which they were
derived constituted an instrumentality lawfully employed by the
government in the exercise of its powers to protect, support, and
instruct the Indians.
In recent years as states have been pinched for revenue, there
have been increasing attempts to tax Indians. In 1970 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court denied the state the power to tax reservation
Indians. 98 The decision is the opposite of the result reached by the
New Mexico Appellate Court in Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue only
191. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4. Wheat) 316, 431 (1819).
192. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 83 N.M. 158, _ , 489 P.2d 666, 670 (1971).
193. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737; (1866).
194. F. CoIEN, FSMERAL INDIA LAW 850 (G.P.O. 1958).
195. United States v. Thurston County, 143 F. 287 (8th Cir. 1906).
196. Commission of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N.W.2d 120 (1970).
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one year previously. Ghahate is unique in that for some reason not
readily apparent, the parties had stipulated that the tax would not
interfere with the tribal right of self government.
1 17
Three cases arising in 1971 with appeals currently pending be-
fore the United States Supreme Court may provide the answer as
to whether tribal sovereignty can withstand the attack of states'
attempted taxation. The first of these cases, Tonasket v. State,'98
arose in Washington. The plaintiff, a Colville Indian, had argued
that the regulating and taxing of his sales of cigarettes on his
reservation by the state interfered with tribal government. The
court rejected this argument and based its decision on what it de-
vined to be the Congressional intent in passing Public Law No. 280."99
The upshot was that the court felt that the civil laws of the State
of Washington should apply to the Indians on the reservations the
same as to other citizens of the state. Such reasoning ignores the
question of whether Public Law 280 authorizes the imposition of
state taxation. Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court ignored
the traditional immunities afforded to Indian tribes and individual
tribal members.
Later that year the Arizona Appellate Court rejected a class
action brought by a Navajo Indian who sought a refund of state
income tax withheld in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission.
20
1
The court seemed to base its decision upon the "personal nature
of an income tax" 201 and an analogy to state-federal taxation. The
court asked:
If then, an income tax by the Federal government or a
state upon the employee of the other does not interfere with
the essential function of the government whose employee is
being taxed, how can it be seriously argued that an income
tax by the State of Arizona upon a Navajo Indian, regard-
less of his employer, causes an impairment of the right of
the Navajo tribe to be self governing?
20 2
The court answered its question in the negative with no ap-
parent reasons given for its conclusion. Since Arizona never assum-
ed civil jurisdiction under Public Law 280; it is difficult to compre-
hend how the state can be said to have the power to impose a
state tax on Indians upon revenue earned upon the reservation.
197. GOhahate v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 98, 451 P.2d 1002 (1969).
198. Id. at 100, 451 P.2d at 1004.
199. Tonasket v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971).
200. Id. at 288.
201. Shubat v. State, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971).
202. Id. at 224.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The most recent of the state attempts to tax Indians is Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Bureau of Revenue.20 3 The tribe claimed an
interference with the tribe's right to reservation self-government
caused by state taxation of operations conducted by the tribe on
non-Indian land. The claim was based on the fact that revenue de-
rived from the operation of the ski-resort is used for the welfare
of the tribe and the resort provides job training for members of
the tribe. The court dismissed these allegations as showing no in-
terference with reservation self-government.204 It was the contention
of the Mescalero Apache tribe "that the taxation might interfere
because the power to tax is the power to destroy and: 'The pur-
pose for which the appellant entered into the ski-resort operation
is being frustrated and possibly would be totally defeated if New
Mexico is allowed to tax the operation.' ",205 The court found the
argument to be speculative. To sustain the reasoning of the New
Mexico court would be to discourage economic development by In-
dian tribes. Since the federal government has subsidized this -par-
ticular economic development of the tribe, to allow state taxation
would be to thwart the purposes of the federal program. This
could be immunized from state taxation since the federal govern-
ment has lent funds for this development and provided United States
Forest Service lands for the project, hence any state taxation would
be taxation of a federal instrumentality.
The Tonasket, McClanahan, and Mescalero cases afford the Su-
preme Court with the opportunity to redefine tribal sovereignty. To
uphold the positions of the states of Washington, New Mexico, and
Arizona would seriously undercut the sovereign immunity of Indian
tribes, hence it would further erode tribal sovereignty. To reverse
the states would buttress tribal sovereignty. Regardless of outcome,
the decision is needed to clarify the powers of states to intrude
in tribal operations as well as the rights of Indian tribes to ex-
ercise the sovereign immunity recognized since The Kansas Indians
case of 1866.206
Conclusion
This appraisal of tribal sovereignty has emphasized recent cases
which contain a faint promise of expansion of the scope of tribal
203. Id. at 224,
204. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 83 N.M. 158, 489 P.2d 666 (1971). Compare Sohol
v. Clark, 479 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1971), with Palm Springs Spa v. County of Riverside, 95
Cal. Rptr. 879, 18 C.A. 3rd 372 (1971).
205. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 83 N.M. 158, - , 489 P.2d 666, 690 (1971).
206. Id.
207. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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sovereignty. 2 8 Glimmerings were noticed in the extent of tribal ad-
ministration of justice,209 the reluctance of courts to extend the
Bill of Rights into controversies between a tribe and its members,
2 10
the respect shown by the Supreme Court for an Indian Court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over contracts transacted within the reser-
vation, 211 the sort of comity accorded valid tribal divorce decrees,
21 2
and the recent restoration of treaty-protected rights to hunt, fish,
trap, and gather wild rice.
213
The aim of this article is not to prognosticate the rise nor the
fall of tribal sovereignty, but instead to record present bounds. Of
course, one can hope that the powers will increase. But until the
effect of the 1968 Civil Rights Act 214 is registered, the limits of
tribal sovereignty are incapable of more precise measurement.
Nonetheless, contrary to the conclusions of some legal writers, trib-
al sovereignty is much more than a "legal fiction ' ' 215 and its exis-
tence is real, not just a "theory. '216 Even if the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty were a legal fiction, judicial enunciation of the doctrine
has given Indians a theory today upon which to build more viable
systems of self-government 2" and economic development.
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217. The right of self-government is a weapon against oppression for in a realm
where the states are powerless to govern and where Congress% occupied with
more pressing national affairs, cannot govern wisely and well, there remains
a large no-man's-land in which government can emanate only from the offi-
cials of the Interior Department or from the Indians themselves. Self-govern-
ment is thus the Indians' only alternative to rule by a government depar-
ment.
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 122.

